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The Senile Testator:
Medicolegal Aspects of Competency
Robert Gene Smith* and Laurence M. Hager**
T ODAY'S ADVANCED MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE and care have caused
the average life expectancy to increase markedly. In 1900,
one in twenty-five living persons was over the age of 65; in 1950,
one in thirteen. While the total population of the United States
doubled between those years, the number of persons sixty-five
years or over almost quadrupled.1 Concurrently, the diseases of
old age have precipitated more frequent will contests on the
grounds of testamentary incompetency.
Although the question of competency concerns mental status
at the specific time the will is made, it is the nonpsychiatric
physician who is most frequently the treating physician. And he
may be called upon to testify to the mental competency of the
patient at testation. Thus general practitioners as well as
physicians specializing in geriatrics and psychiatrists need to
understand the criteria of testamentary competency. Then their
responsibility not only to the patient, but also to society, can be
carried out more fully. 2
No less is the problem encountered by the lawyer in his
dealings with aged clients. He may be undecided as to whether
or not to call in a psychiatric expert at the time the client makes
the will. Or in the aftermath he may be unable to decipher the
psychiatric jargon adduced during the contest of the will. Thus,
as the importance to the medic in learning something about testa-
mentary competency cannot be overemphasized, the same is true
for the lawyer regarding psychiatric concepts and terminology.
Medical evidence in support or attack of testamentary
capacity has been more voluminous than effective in the modern
will contest. Due perhaps to the differences between legal and
medical notions, this area of inter-professional contact abounds
with confusion.
* B.S., Univ. of Oklahoma; M.D., Washington Univ. (St. Louis); LL.B.,
Harvard; M.P.H., Harvard School of Public Health. Address: RFD #3,
Broken Arrow, Okla.
** B.A., LL.B., Harvard; Member of the Faculty, Univ. of Liberia, School
of Law; Monrovia, Liberia.
1 Noyes and Kolb, Modern Clinical Psychiatry 287 (5th ed. 1958).
2 Usdin, Testamentary Capacity: A Medicolegal Problem, 172 Int'l Record
of Medicine 629, 630 (1959).
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The confusion has been costly for both professions. Witness-
ing a so-called "battle of the experts" causes jurors to lose their
respect for physicians. The courts are likewise skeptical of medi-
cal testimony. While paying lip service to psychiatric evidence,
they repeatedly base decisions on what has been called an "un-
expressed major premise"-the objective rationality of the will
instrument.3 The lawyer thus finds himself participating in mere
ritual; he turns to medical men when he is expected to do so,
but to resolve ethical and tactical issues he relies on personal
observations as to the testator's competency.4 And for their part,
the physicians and psychiatrists who examine a testator before
execution of the will, or testify in court after his death, are often
ignorant of what the law means by the term "testamentary
capacity." Thus it may be asked whether medical science can
more effectively serve the senile testator and his attorney.
The scientific study of old age and the aging process began
in the mid-nineteenth century; in 1909 Nascher coined the term
"geriatrics" to define the medical branch specializing in ailments
of the aged.5 More recently psychiatry has concerned itself with
mental disorders affecting old people.6 Research and clinical
study have brought about changes in medical terminology and
diagnoses.
But these changes have hardly penetrated the legal fortress.
The fixed standards of testamentary capacity were to control
regardless of the particular medical situation. Indeed, courts
sometimes have gone out of their way to insulate themselves
from medical learning. A Maine court declared that ". . . analy-
sis and classification of mental diseases is impractical and un-
necessary in legal science." 7 Such aloofness has proven unfor-
tunate. Especially in cases involving the senile testator has this
absence of communication served to undermine the legal
standard.
The rapid emergence of geriatric psychiatry and the evolu-
3 See Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major
Premise, 53 Yale L. J. 271 (1944).
4 Interviews with Richard S. Bowers, Esq., Member of the Boston Bar and
A. James Casner, Associate Dean and Weld Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School.
5 Palmer, Braceland, and Hastings, Somato-Psychic Disorders of Old Age,
99 Am. J. Psychiatry 856 (1943).
6 Leaders in this field were Rothschild, Malamud, and Sands. Interview
with Donald P. Kenefick, M.D., Assistant Director Law-Medicine Research
Institute, Boston, Massachusetts.
7 In re Will of Loomis, 133 Me. 181, 185, 174 Atl. 38, 40 (1934).
Sept., 1964
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss3/3
SENILE TESTATOR
tion of psychiatric nomenclature have left the courts behind. A
good example of this gap between medical and legal fact con-
cerns "senile dementia." Behind the legal presumption that
senile dementia was a progressive disease lacking even the possi-
bility of "lucid interval," was the assumption that it was a dis-
tinct disease entity which could be clinically distinguished from
other, non-progressive mental disorders in aged persons. This
legal fact, however, does not always receive general acceptance
among practicing psychiatrists."
The law has failed to recognize recent advances in geriatric
psychiatry. Moreover, where medical language has been used,
the terminology is either outdated or misapplied. What follows
is an attempt to describe the nature and policy of the legal
standard for testamentary competency, to set forth the current
medical approach to senility and mental disease, and to suggest
practical ways for the lawyer to use geriatric psychiatry in be-
half of the senile testator.
I. Free Testation and Testamentary Capacity.
Although the notion of "free testation" has been spoken of as
a natural right, it is more precisely a right resting upon a statu-
tory base.9 Indeed, until the passage of the Statute of Wills in
1540, freedom of testation was the exception rather than the
rule. In the United States the state legislatures exercised full
control over testamentary power. Thus while the right to make
a will is neither a property right nor a constitutional right, it
has become so entrenched in Anglo-American law as to acquire
" a sanctity which it did not have originally." 10
Under the principle of free testation, the testator may dis-
pose of his property by will as he wishes, subject only to statu-
tory restrictions. A number of arguments are often made to
justify this power: (1) the property instinct which implies free
disposition beyond death is basic in man's nature, (2) free testa-
tion encourages frugality, thrift, and individual initiative, (3)
the control which the law gives a man over the disposition of
his property allows him to command the attentions of others in
his old age, (4) free testation avoids the necessity of breaking
up land into uneconomic portions, (5) free testation logically
8 See infra, part U1.
9 Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency, 38
Mich. L. Rev. 1189, 1211 (1940).
10 I Page, Wills sec. 3.2 at 66-7 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1960).
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coincides with the democratic ideal of freedom and with the
philosophic ideal of immortality of soul." On the other hand,
"freedom of testation . . . is restricted by the operation of
policies looking toward the protection of the family as a social
institution." 12
The courts have generally respected the liberal spirit of free
testation. Even the fact that the disposition of property by will
is "capricious, unjust, spiteful, eccentric, revengeful or injudi-
cious" will not of itself invalidate the will.'" But limitations do
exist. The courts will refuse to enforce destructful provisions.
14
Some states still place considerable restrictions upon charitable
gifts. 1" And most states preserve minimal rights of a surviving
spouse to a statutory forced share or to dower or curtesy. 113
The theory and practice of free testation have not endured
without challenge. It has been termed "shocking" to permit a
man to pauperize his dependent family and thereby cast the
burden of support upon society.' 7 And freedom of testation
tends toward great accumulations of wealth."8 Moreover, it en-
courages litigation over the validity of the decedent's plan of
succession. 19 Perhaps for these reasons, "the law has charted a
course between the extremes of complete freedom of testation
and a fixed course of inheritance." 20
The history of testamentary capacity follows closely on the
heels of free testation. Three years after the first Statute of
Wills it was provided that wills by an idiot or by any person
de non sane memory should be ineffectual to transfer property. 2 1
This statutory limitation was repeated by modern legislatures
in the United States. For example, in Massachusetts, G. L. c.
191, sec. 1 provides: "Every person of full age and sound mind
may by his last will . .. dispose of his property. . . ." Other
states provide that a testator must have "a sound mind and
11 Id. sec. 1.7 at 27-8.
12 Green, supra note 9 at 1212.
13 1 Page, op. cit. supra note 10, sec. 3.11 at 89-90.
14 1 Page, op. cit. supra note 10, sec. 3.11 at 94.
15 Id. sec. 3.15 at 104-5.
16 Id. sec. 3.12 at 94-5.
17 Atkinson, Wills sec. 5 at 34 (2d ed. 1953).
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 I Page, op. cit. supra note 10, sec. 1.7 at 28.
21 Statute of Wills, 1543, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 5.
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memory" or "a sound and disposing mind and memory." 22 The
basic requirement of sound mind however is generally uniform
despite variations in statutory language; it has been the province
of the courts to define the mental requirement.
One of the earliest and most complete formulations of the
legal test was laid down by Lord Cockburn in Banks v. Good-
fellow: 23
. .. that a testator shall understand the nature of the act
and its effects; shall understand the extent of property of
which he is disposing; shall be able to comprehend and
appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect; and
with a view to the latter object, that no disorder of the mind
shall poison his affections, pervert his sense of right, or pre-
vent the exercise of his natural faculties-that no insane de-
lusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property
and bring about a disposal of it which, if the mind had been
sound, would not have been made.
It has been pointed out 24 that the doctrine of testamentary
capacity serves three protective functions in the will making
process: (1) protection of the public from the irrational harmful
acts of the incompetent, (2) protection of the family from un-
reasonable disheritance, and (3) protection of the incompetent
from his own erratic behavior.
The legal test for competency to make a will is not the same
as that used to determine guardianship, conservatorship, or com-
mitment to a mental institution.25  Moreover, less capacity is
required to execute a will than to enter into contracts or conduct
business because the latter transactions are more susceptible to
fraud.
Modern courts purport to apply the Cockburn test by making
three simple inquiries: (1) does the testator know the nature
and extent of his property, (2) does he have a plan for its dis-
position, (3) is he aware of the natural objects of his bounty?
Although the judge-made standards for testamentary capacity
seem easy to apply, they have been troublesome in practice.
Different courts have given varying emphasis to different parts
of the standard.2 6 Even more disturbing has been the frequent
22 I Page, op. cit. supra note 10, sec. 12.15 at 593.
23 L. R. 5 Q. B. 549, 565 (1870).
24 Epstein, Testamentary Capacity, Reasonableness and Family Maintenance:
A Proposal for Meaningful Reform, 35 Templ. L. Q. 231, 232 (1962).
25 H Newhall, Settlement of Estates and Fiduciary Law in Massachusetts
sec. 343 at 399 (4th ed. 1958).
26 1 Page, op. cit. supra note 10, sec. 12.21 at 611.
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1964
13 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
recourse to what Professor Green has labeled the "unexpressed
major premise."
. . . since, both in unconscious desire and in articulate ef-
fort, the court is seeking evidence on whether mental in-
competency has affected the particular transaction, the
dominant factor in the evidence is whether the court sees
the particular transaction in its result as that which a
reasonably competent man might have made. 27
It would seem that this manner of judging soundness of mind by
the will instrument has elements of circularity. Where com-
petence vel non to make a will is inferred from the will itself,
the threefold subjective test is circumvented.
Finally, the courts have failed to take into account modern
advances in psychiatry and geriatrics when resolving questions
of testamentary capacity. 28 And when venturing to recognize
medical fact in the area of senile diseases, they have veered
either too close to the Scylla of misapplication of diagnosis or to
the Charybdis of undervaluation of medical testimony.
H. Senescence and Mental Illness
This paper will explore, from the point of view of the
standard nomenclature adopted by the American Psychiatric As-
sociation, some of the mental afflictions of the senile testator.
Its primary aim is to enlighten the physician and the lawyer by
attempting to equate the psychiatric terminology with legal
definitions and to promote a better understanding of this area as
a whole. Particular emphasis will be placed upon senile psycho-
sis and cerebral arteriosclerosis because they often give rise to
medico-legal problems when testators are labeled with one of
these two terms.
The words "incapacity" and "incompetency" are often used
interchangeably. In cases one encounters such terms as "non
compos mentis," "insanity," "lunacy," "mental unsoundness," and
"weakness of mind," remnants from days gone by with roughly
the same meaning as mental incompetency. The question of the
mental competency of any individual can always potentially be
raised. Legal tests exist to differentiate the incompetent per-
son from the competent person. These legal tests specify and
attempt to define with varying degrees of precision that state of
mind which renders one fit or unfit for legal activity.
27 Green, supra note 3 at 307.
28 Green, Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency, 6 Mo. L. Rev. 141, 145
(1941).
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In medical science a patient is either sane or insane. Yet a
man may be medically insane and still be legally capable of
making a valid will. The courts have upheld the capacity of a
psychotic person to write a will.29 This distinction should be kept
in mind in considering the psychiatric or medical classification of
those mental afflictions which may or may not render the testator
incompetent, according to the legal test employed.
Further, no legal test refers specifically to unconscious forces
of the personality, nor depends on medical case history exclu-
sively. On the other hand, the legal definitions never rule out
such factors. Therefore, the testimony of the psychiatrist can
encompass the totality of psychiatric knowledge. In addition,
the psychiatrist can speak in terms of the legal definitions or
he can abstain from doing so if he prefers to express himself in
psychiatric terms. Thus the psychiatrist has the widest latitude
in giving his opinions.30
While diseases of old age are the major group, a considerable
number of other conditions also provide bases for contesting the
will on grounds of mental incompetency. Although this paper
will be concerned with the former, it should be pointed out that
the all-inclusive classification of psychiatric disorders includes
the latter as well. This system of classification was prepared by
the Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics of the American
Psychiatric Association. In 1952 it was adopted by the American
Psychiatric Association as official. 31
The general categories of the official classification are simple
and correspond to recognized principles of organic and mental
pathology.3 2 Approached from this frame of reference, psychi-
atric disorders fall into three groups:
I. Disorders caused by or associated with impairment of brain
tissue function. This group is further subdivided into:
A. Acute brain disorders, e.g., disorders due to or associated
with infection, trauma, drug or alcohol intoxication, etc.
B. Chronic brain disorders, e.g., disorders due to or as-
sociated with prolonged infections, circulatory dis-
turbances, disturbances of metabolism, growth or nu-
trition, etc.
29 In re Stephani's Will, 250 App. Div. 253, 294 N. Y. Supp. 624 (1937).
30 Mezer and Rheingold, Mental Capacity and Incompetency: A Psycho-
legal Problem, 118 Am. J. Psychiatry 827, 829 (1962).
31 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (1952).
32 Noyes & Kolb, op. cit. supra note 1 at 163.
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II. Mental Deficiencies. This group includes only those in which
the mental defect is of familial origin, has existed since
birth and is without demonstrated brain disease or known
prenatal cause.
III. Disorders of psychogenic origin or without clearly defined
clinical cause or structural change in the brain. This group
is a large one since it includes the psychoneuroses, a major
part of the psychotic reactions, the psychosomatic disorders
and the personality disorders.
It is under the first category that the majority of afflictions af-
fecting the senile testator are found.
When the psychiatrist initially sees a patient, an attempt may
be made to classify the illness under one of the three categories,
although the psychiatrist is aware that there may be some over-
lapping among the groups. With a good history and substanti-
ated with psychological tests, the diagnosis of mental deficiency
(group II) may pose no great problem in the absence of addi-
tional disorders falling under any of the other categories. In
distinguishing between an illness associated with impairment of
brain tissue function (group I) and one of psychogenic origin
or without clearly defined clinical cause or structural change in
the brain (group III), the psychiatrist looks for evidence of what
is known as the organic syndrome, which is characteristic of
group I afflictions. Here again, there may be some overlapping
and the psychiatrist must tease out those overlying components
in order to place them in their proper categories.
The organic syndrome is the psychiatrist's term for a group
of symptoms and signs, which, when considered together,
characterize a disease or lesion associated with impairment of
brain tissue function. The symptoms characterizing this syn-
drome are caused by some process which has impaired, usually
diffusely, the functions of cerebral tissue resulting in a deficit
in the capacity for intellectual activity. If the brain impairment
or lesion is reversible, it is classified as an acute brain disorder,
regardless of the etiology, onset or duration of the mental ill-
ness. If the brain impairment with the accompanying organic
syndrome is relatively permanent and more or less irreversible
symptoms of loss of brain function remain, the brain disorder is
chronic. Thus in either the acute or chronic forms the ac-
companying symptoms comprise the organic syndrome. 33
According to the degree in which brain function is impaired
the symptoms of the organic syndrome may vary. Among the
33 Noyes & Kolb, op. cit. supra note 1 at 170.
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symptoms noted in the usual case are the following: impairment
of judgment, memory, reasoning, orientation and other intellec-
tual functions, and sometimes instability and shallowness of feel-
ings or emotions. Confusion may be quite marked in the acute
syndrome. Various psychotic, neurotic or behavior reactions may
appear with the organic syndrome and may be characterized or
determined by the person's essential personality pattern, his im-
mediate environmental situation, current emotional conflicts, and
the setting of interpersonal relations. 34 Further, a brain disorder
which appeared to be acute and reversible in its earlier stages
may later show indications of having caused permanent damage
and results in a chronic brain disorder.
Thus in the organic syndrome many alterations of behavior
are the direct result of disease of the nervous system; or, in other
words, the symptoms are primary manifestations of neurologic
disease. Others may be secondary, in the sense of being reactions
to the catastrophe of losing one's mind.
It is hoped that by the foregoing description the lawyer can
gain some insight into the psychiatrist's approaches to the prob-
lem of classifying mental illnesses. Since the senile testator is
more often afflicted with group I disorders characterized by the
organic syndrome, this paper will not attempt to characterize
the much larger group of disorders of psychogenic origin or with-
out clearly defined clinical cause or structural change in the
brain, that is, those disorders falling under group III. Before
considering some of the more common group I mental illnesses
with which the senile testator may be afflicted, it is appropriate
at this point to define two more terms from the psychiatrist's
vocabulary.
As noted earlier, in medical science one is either sane or in-
sane; however the word "insanity" is not used by the psychia-
trist. Instead the psychiatrist employs the word "psychosis" in
order to avoid the legal implications of "insanity," although the
former carries with it a similar connotation. It is a gruesome
task, indeed, to define psychosis because the clinical criteria for
making this diagnosis are vague and poorly defined. Even most
of the psychiatric textbooks are aloof when it comes to a defini-
tion that would be acceptable to all psychiatrists. The line be-
tween psychosis and the clinical status of being without psycho-
sis is difficult to draw. Yet for medical purposes one is either
psychotic or not psychotic.
34 Ibid.
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More specifically, psychosis implies a mental derangement
in which the whole personality may be changed, or, in some in-
stances, only a portion of it may be changed. Further, to the
psychotic individual reality may be qualitatively changed. Judg-
ment in some areas is usually fundamentally affected and the
one with psychosis may not even realize that he is mentally ill.
Psychosis may occur with or without organic impairment of the
brain. Similarly, one may have an organic syndrome and be or
not be psychotic.
Experienced psychiatrists may disagree in borderline cases
of psychosis. Some may even draw the line, in some cases, ac-
cording to whether or not the patient should be institutionalized
because he is unable to cope with the ordinary conditions of life
on the outside. As judges may disagree among themselves, so
may psychiatrists, although in the latter instance there is no
final arbiter.
In modern neurologic parlance the term "dementia" usually
denotes a clinical state comprised of failing memory and loss of
intellectual functions due to a chronic, progressive degenerative
disease of the brain.35 Although this term may be used to dis-
tinguish a failure of intellectual function due to interference
with development as in mental defect (amentia),31, it is no longer
frequently employed by psychiatrists. When dementia is used
by itself it denotes the same thing as an organic syndrome of the
chronic variety and should not be confused with "senile demen-
tia," which is considered by some as a distinct disease entity in
which the senile individual manifests the chronic organic syn-
drome or dementia due to diffuse atrophy of the brain. Other-
wise dementia implies the deterioration or loss of the intellectual
faculties whether it be due to a brain tumor, a cerebral hemor-
rhage followed by permanent impairment, syphilis of the brain,
or any other disease which is associated with diffuse damage to
the cerebral cortex.37
It cannot be overemphasized that the three main groups of
mental disorders and their respective sub-categories of the official
nomenclature of the American Psychiatric Association serve
merely as a means to classify mental disease. At the same time,
the psychiatrist is constantly aware of the principle of biological
35 Harrison, Principles of Internal Medicine, 343 (3rd ed. 1958).
36 French, Index of Differential Diagnosis 212 (7th ed. Douthwaite 1954).
37 Interview with Ruth Ehrenberg, M.D., Clinical Director of Medfield State
Hospital, Medfield, Massachusetts.
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variation, that is, no two biological creatures are exactly alike
in their anatomy, their behavior, and their reaction to disease.
This is particularly true in the field of mental illnesses, which
affect the personality, a product of one's external environment.
On the other hand, the standard nomenclature assists in de-
scribing particular behavioristic phenomena that often occur to-
gether, thus providing the psychiatrist with a form of short-
hand that is understandable by other members of his profession.
Nevertheless, the lawyer should guard against construing any
psychiatric terminology as the final word. In other words, the
official nomenclature does not occupy the same position in the
psychiatric field as a statute or administrative regulation does in
law. Thus in the legal world the individual is supposed to con-
form with the law, while in the psychiatric world the classifi-
cation tries to conform with the individual's behavior.
Furthermore, it should be noted that in spite of the adop-
tion of the official nomenclature by the American Psychiatric
Association in 1952, in recent years there has been a growing
tendency by most psychiatrists to place less emphasis upon
classification of mental disorders.38 Perhaps this is due to the
recognition that psychiatric patients sometimes respond better
to treatment administered on an ad hominem basis rather than
on a classification rationale. In the future, the efficient psychia-
trist should have the attitude and the capacity to assimilate a
structural and a functional orientation simultaneously without
attempting a lot of loose correlations of neurologic and psycho-
logic data.39
Senescence is the process of growing old. It is a natural
involutional process operating with the passage of time. With
increase in age there is a continual and progressive loss of
physical and mental resources, which tends to arouse feelings
of helplessness, of loneliness, and fear. The stresses of increasing
mental and physical limitations may result in anxiety which
evokes various protective mechanisms; and, these in turn, may
only exaggerate the pace of mental deterioration.
Some individuals, however, do not succumb so readily to
the aging process. Dean Roscoe Pound, at 92, still maintains his
eight to five office hours at Harvard Law School. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes was active at the age of 91. Although the
38 Interview with Theodore F. Lindberg, M.D., Superintendent, Medfield
State Hospital, Medfield, Massachusetts.
39 Hoch and Zubin, The Future of Psychiatry 169 (1962).
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term "senility" is often applied loosely to the aging process as
it affects both body and mind, it should be restricted to those
who show definite decay of the mental faculties regardless of
anatomic changes that may be indicative of aging.40
There are certain mental changes occurring almost uni-
versally in old age. These include weakening of initiative, re-
striction of interests, alteration of regular sleep habits, impair-
ment of inhibitory control and defects of memory, comprehen-
sion, and responsiveness. Memory for recent events may be the
first to fade, while ability to recall remote events may appear to
be more keen. These changes, when moderate, are not significant,
and may be regarded as manifestations of the normal process of
aging. It is only when they become exaggerated that they gain
a pathological meaning and constitute the prodromal symptom-
atology of mental breakdown. 4 1
Extreme old age does not of itself disqualify a person from
making a valid will; old age or senescence becomes an important
evidential fact when found in connection with mental incom-
petency. Numerous cases can be found upholding wills made by
persons advanced in years.42 The transition from usual old age
to senility is ordinarily gradual and any decision as to when the
imaginary line is passed must often be an arbitrary one. Then,
too, the difference between senility and psychosis associated with
senility is often only a shade, nevertheless the psychiatrist often
has the responsibility of drawing that very thin line. In drawing
it the psychiatrist has to make a decision that not only might
be considered an anthropological and philosophical one, but one
in which opinions of psychiatrists differ markedly.4 3
The process of becoming senile starts with an increased con-
striction of activities and ends in mental destitution, and the
pathology of senility is concerned with study of the characteris-
tics of this change, from normal senescence into mental decay.
Factors that narrow the individual's life also influence the oc-
currence of senility.44 Retirement, lack of responsibility, ex-
40 Interview with Robert K. Funkhouser, M.D., Director, Geriatric Clinic,
Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts.
41 Palmer, Braceland & Hastings, supra note 5 at 859.
42 Collins v. Long, 95 Ore. 63, 186 Pac. 1038 (1920) upheld the will of a
94 year-old testator; In re Bose's Estate, 136 Neb. 156, 285 N.W. 319 (1939)
a 96 year-old testator's will was upheld four years later when he died; and
Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa. 495 (1882) upheld a will made at the age of 101.
43 Usdin, supra note 2, at 632.
44 Wilson, The Pathology of Senility, 111 Am. J. Psychiatry 902, 905 (1955).
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clusion of new interests, a feeling of not being wanted and finally
admission to a mental hospital all have a tendency to bring on
deterioration and eventually death. Loss of motivation and loss
of reason for living are part of the psychological pathology of
senility.45 At the same time, new interests, increased human re-
lations and group activities seem to prevent the changing of
normal senescence into senility. 46
Senility is not merely a chronological fact; it varies with
physiological status, with environmental factors, with personality
and with superimposed emotional illness. Both biological and
sociopsychological factors contribute to the changes of senility.47
An individual may be senile but yet not be psychotic. Some
individuals, however, seem to progress further along the sliding
scale of senility until they reach a point at which they are also
labeled "psychotic." It is at this stage that the confusion in both
medicine and law arises. In the past there was a tendency to
label the senile individual who became psychotic with either
the term "senile psychosis" or "senile dementia," two words
used interchangeably in both the medical and legal literature.
This misnomer has given rise to numerous medico-legal prob-
lems in testamentary competency and therefore represents the
crux of this paper. Stated briefly, the problem is whether senile
psychosis is a separate, distinct disease entity, as some medical
authors maintain, or whether the term should be used, if at all,
merely to describe the phenomenon of psychosis occurring in an
aged individual whenever the underlying cause is obscure or
else attributed to atrophic and other anatomic changes in the
brain. This area is further complicated by the placing of the
diagnostic label "psychosis associated with cerebral arterioscle-
rosis" on a senile individual who is also psychotic and has clinical
signs and symptoms of arteriosclerosis.
An extremely fine point for the psychiatrist can be the dif-
ferentiation of senile psychosis from cerebral arteriosclerosis as-
sociated with psychosis, if such differentiation is possible. Some
courts have even recognized that cerebral arteriosclerosis is not
identical with senile psychosis,48 thus extending into the legal
area a concept that is not always clear in the mind of the phy-
sician. Adding further to the confusion, one legal writer has
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Noyes & Kolb, op. cit. supra note 1, at 287.
48 In re Chylak's Estate, 55 Lackawanna Jurist 129, 131 (Pa. 1954).
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even attempted to distinguish clinically senile dementia from
senile psychosis,49 two terms used as synonyms in medical termi-
nology.
Senile psychosis and psychosis associated with cerebral
arteriosclerosis, two disorders which resemble one another in
many ways, were not given separate consideration until relatively
recent times. As late as 1900 medical textbooks still included
under the term senile psychoses both arteriosclerotic conditions
and senile dementia, without any consistent distinction between
them.50 Furthermore, it appeared that a variety of miscellaneous
mental disorders occurring by chance in elderly persons were
included under the heading of senile psychoses.5 1
Senile psychoses and psychoses with cerebral arterioscle-
rosis are thought to comprise the great bulk of mental illness in
later life for which hospitalization is commonly required.5 2 At
the Worcester State Hospital in Massachusetts, 41.9 per cent of
all first admissions during the year ending June 30, 1945, were
patients 60 years of age or older. During the same year 33.7
per cent of first admissions were classified as senile or arterio-
sclerotic psychoses.5 3 Moreover, with increased attention to
geriatric psychiatry, it is now appreciated that patients who
formerly would have been classified under "senile psychoses"
may be found to have primarily disorders falling under group
III of the official nomenclature. 54 It is believed by some that
senile psychosis is not a specific disease entity, but rather that
the aging process may serve as key to complete mental break-
down in one who, for life, has been afflicted with various under-
lying problems in his personality. 55
In the new nomenclature adopted by the American Psychi-
atric Association neither senile psychosis nor senile dementia is
mentioned; however the disorder in which atrophy of the brain
and loss of nerve cells are significant features is now designated
"Chronic Brain Syndrome Associated with Senile Brain Disease,"
and cerebral arteriosclerosis has been designated "Chronic Brain
49 Atkinson, op. cit. supra note 17 at 234.
50 Rothschild, Senile Psychoses and Psychoses with Cerebral Arteriosclerosis
in Mental Disorders in Later Life 289 (Kaplan ed. 1956).
51 Id. at 290-91.
52 Id. at 289.
53 Ibid.
54 Interview with Ruth Ehrenberg, M.D.
55 Ibid.
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Syndrome Associated with Cerebral Arteriosclerosis." 56 Fur-
thermore, medical literature still employs the term "senile
psychosis," but "senile dementia" is used less frequently than it
was several decades ago. It should be noted that the standard
nomenclature only classifies the chronic brain disorder associated
with cerebral arteriosclerosis in a separate sub-category from
senile brain disease on the basis of whether or not cerebral
arteriosclerosis is present, and thus in no way does it intend to
indicate that the two categories necessarily represent separate
and distinct disease entities.
In recent years, studies of senile psychosis 57 and arterioscle-
rotic psychosis,58 have suggested the need for revision of the
traditional belief that the only factor of importance was the ob-
vious damage to the brain noted in both senile psychosis and
arteriosclerotic psychosis. Some patients with mild mental
changes showed marked pathologic changes in the brain, while
others with pronounced clinical disturbances displayed relatively
slight neuropathologic involvement. Rothschild believes that too
exclusive preoccupation with the cerebral pathology has led to a
tendency to forget that the changes are occurring in mentally
functioning persons who may react to a given situation in various
ways. In other words, he recognizes that the same damage which
produces psychosis in one case may not do so in another. Fur-
ther, one medical author reports an increased frequency of cases
of senile psychosis in a concentration camp, attributing the in-
crease in part to the psychologic conditions in the camp.59
Although it is agreed that there is not always a correlation
between the degrees of anatomical changes and intellectual im-
pairment,60 there is no widespread agreement as to whether
senile psychosis and psychosis with cerebral arteriosclerosis are
separate disease entities. Rothschild has been the leading pro-
56 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (1952).
57 Rothschild, Pathologic Changes in Senile Psychosis and Their Psycho-
biologic Significance, 93 Am. J. Psychiatry 757 (1937); Rothschild and Sharp,
The Origin of Senile Psychoses: Neuropathologic Factors and Factors of a
More Personal Nature, 2 Dis. Nerv. System 49 (1941).
58 Rothschild, The Role of the Prenorbid Personality in Arteriosclerotic
Psychoses, 100 Am. J. Psychiatry 501 (1944); Neuropathologic Changes in
Arteriosclerotic Psychoses and Their Psychiatric Significance, 48 Arch.
Neurol. Psychiatry 417 (1942).
59 Kral, Psychiatric Observations Under Severe Chronic Stress, 108 Am. J.
Psychiatry 185, 188 (1951).
60 Noyes & Kolb, op. cit. supra note 1 at 288; II American Handbook of
Psychiatry 1030 (Arieti ed. 1959).
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ponent in maintaining that senile psychosis is a separate disease
entity although this distinction is not recognized in some of the
modern textbooks.
Rothschild advocates that senile psychosis or senile dementia
are the labels properly restricted to those chronic mental dis-
orders in elderly individuals which show in common progres-
sively increasing signs of organic mental deficit in association
with characteristic changes in the brain.6 1 His evidence is not
entirely convincing; he has, however, contributed perhaps more
literature to this area than has any other medical author. His
work reveals that in some instances of senile psychosis there are
characteristic atrophic changes in the brain. Rothschild's ob-
servation that there is no definite correlation between pathologi-
cal changes and clinical disturbances seems to detract from his
argument that senile psychosis and psychosis associated with
cerebral arteriosclerosis are two separate diseases.
According to Rothschild, the onset in senile psychosis is
practically always gradual, except in occasional cases compli-
cated by arteriosclerotic disease.62 In some instances a minor
physical ailment or some situational stress may appear as a land-
mark between the senile changes of old age and psychotic be-
havior.63 As the psychosis develops, symptoms of intellectual
deficit dominate the clinical picture. There is major impairment
of memory, which first tends to affect recall of recent events
and immediate retention. The senile psychotic individual tends
to live in the past, indulging in reminiscences concerning friends,
relatives, and occurrences of long ago.6 4 Fabrications may be
observed and orientation is defective for time and place, with
loss of self-identity usually a much later development. 65
A clear-cut clinical division between various types of senile
psychoses is not only complex but somewhat artificial, because
confusional episodes, episodes of depression, and even exacer-
bation of paranoid trends, which form the bulwark of most
classifications, may occur in the course of any type of senile
psychosis.66 Yet some authors describe specific types of senile
psychoses: 67 (1) simple senile deterioration, (2) delirious and
61 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 294.
62 Id. at 299.
63 Ibid.
64 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 300.
65 Ibid.
66 II American Handbook of Psychiatry, op. cit. supra note 60 at 1028.
67 Ibid.
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confused types, (3) depressed and agitated types, (4) paranoid
types, and (5) presbyophrenic s types.
This classification is of doubtful value. 9 The same individ-
ual may present a picture of simple deterioration at one time, an
agitated state later, and a delirious condition at yet another
time.7 0 Clinical cases in which symptoms of simple deterioration
predominate occur with greatest frequency.
71
Psychological testing has been utilized to evaluate the de-
grees of mental deterioration in senile dementia. The "Copple
senescent decline quotient" and the "Wechsler deterioration
test" have been particularly tried. The results, however, appear
to have been interpreted with no uniformity.72
In one study of 123 cases of both senile and arteriosclerotic
psychoses it was felt that the prodromal states of both have con-
sistent patterns which resemble each other so closely that for
purposes of early diagnosis it is convenient to consider them
as one.73 It is in this prodromal stage that patients become likely
to contract sudden unsuitable marriages or to execute a suc-
cession of new wills.7 4 These same authors then note that fol-
lowing the prodromal stage senile dementia takes the form of
gradual mental deterioration without characteristic acute
neurological symptoms, while psychosis with arteriosclerosis may
follow a similar course, but more often is marked by the onset
of some neurological disorder caused usually by a cerebral vas-
cular insult.7 ' They also note that a frequent finding in routine
autopsies in elderly cases is the presence of large masses of
softened or destroyed tissue in the brain resulting from cerebral
thrombosis and advanced arteriosclerosis, but in the clinical rec-
ords there is often no evidence of psychotic breakdown. This, it
is believed, would indicate that the organic destruction of tissue
in the nervous system is not always in itself a causative factor
in the psychoses of the aged. They further maintain that it is
unlikely that more than a fifth of the persons with cerebral
thromboses or advanced arteriosclerosis experience mental
68 The word "presbyophrenia," or insanity of old age, was coined by Kahl-
baum in contrast with "hebephrenia," or insanity of youth.
69 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 300.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 II American Handbook of Psychiatry, op. cit. supra note 60 at 1027.
73 Palmer, Braceland & Hastings, supra note 5 at 860.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
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breakdowns. Thus the deciding factor may be an inherited tend-
ency, the element of chance in the location of the lesions, or
additional unsuspected pathogenic agencies. 70
There is evidence that inheritance is a factor in senility.77
Organic diseases of the heart, kidneys, bones, joints, and other
organs have been found to be contributing factors to mental
breakdown.78 It is often accepted that the anatomical changes
associated with senile dementia are a result of deficiencies in the
cerebral blood flow with a concomitant decrease in brain metab-
olism and available oxygen.79 Cortical tissue especially is ex-
tremely sensitive to a diminished supply of oxygens0 . It would
appear, therefore, that not all the factors producing senile
psychosis are known.8 '
Loss of brain substance is one of the shortcomings of the
dotage. Essential anatomic changes of the senile brain consist of
loss of nerve cells and fibers in addition to sclerosis (hardening),
whether active or relative.8 2 Atrophy or wasting away to the
extent of microgyria (smallness of the convolutions of the brain)
in senility is a common occurrence and it varies from barely
visible sulcus accentuation to striking sclerosis.8 3 Under the
microscope the cerebral cortex displays characteristic senile
plaques made up of silver-staining debris.8 4 Another less com-
mon finding is Alzheimer's fibrillary changes,8 5 which are pe-
culiar clumps or rope-like coils of intracellular neurofibrils, a
material found within nerve cells. These are the changes de-
scribed with senile psychosis, but they are no different from
those found in almost any aged individual, whether senile, psy-
chotic, or without any exaggerated mental changes.
Senile psychosis is, according to some authors,8 6 accom-
76 Id. at 859.
77 Wilson, supra note 44 at 905; Interview with Robert K. Funkhouser, M.D.
78 Kay & Roth, Physical Accompaniments of Mental Disorders in Old Age,
II Lancet 740, 743 (1955).
79 McFarland, The Psychological Aspects of Aging, 32 Bull. N. Y. Acad.
Med. 14, 23 (1956).
80 Ibid.
81 Noyes & Kolb, op. cit. supra note 1 at 288.
82 Anderson, Pathology 1335 (4th ed. 1961).
83 Id. at 1336.
84 Ibid.
85 Sands, The Neuropsychiatric Disorders of the Aged, 51 N. Y. State J. of
Med. 2370 (1951); Anderson, op. cit. supra note 82 at 1336.
86 Dovenmuehle, Geriatric Psychiatry, 27 Law & Contemp. Prob. 133, 136
(1962); Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 294.
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panied by other evidence affecting the entire body. They de-
scribe loss of elasticity of skin, wasting of muscles, shrinking of
soft tissue, and muscular weakness. 8 7 But they make no note
of similar changes occurring in aged individuals who are neither
senile nor psychotic. Rothschild maintains that as a rule the
heart and other organs are atrophic, except in cases in which
there is an admixture of generalized arteriosclerosis,8 8 where
cardiac enlargement may be prominent. In studies of senile
psychosis by Kay and Roth, cardiac disease could be rarely
identified; 89 however they seemed to label as "cerebral arterio-
sclerotic" those cases in which arteriosclerosis was present, thus
imposing an artificial distinction.
Data obtained by Rothschild in his "anatomically verified"
cases indicate that senile psychosis is much commoner in women
than in men, in the proportion of more than two to one.10
Atherosclerosis, which affects the coronary, cerebral, and periph-
eral arteries has a pronounced predilection for the male sex; 91
therefore, the apparent greater incidence of senile psychosis in
women could be attributed, in part, to a tendency to label the
disorder "senile psychosis" whenever there is absence of athero-
sclerosis, or arteriosclerosis as it is often called, which usually
affects the coronary, cerebral, and peripheral arteries. Thus
Rothschild's thesis that senile psychosis is a distinct entity has
even less credence if the artificial distinction of absence of
arteriosclerosis is one of his criteria for sustaining the diagnosis.
Although he recognizes that admixtures of the two disorders do
occur, he offers no valid scientific criteria for distinguishing the
two when and if they occur together.
Rothschild defines psychoses with cerebral arteriosclerosis
as mental disorders of middle-aged and elderly persons associated
with damage due to arteriosclerotic involvement of the cerebral
blood vessels.9 2 In general usage, the term arteriosclerosis is
used in a broad sense to include the following: (a) atherosclero-
sis, which affects the larger arteries and is characterized chiefly
in intimal changes (in the innermost of the three coats of a blood
vessel); (b) arteriolosclerosis, in which the arterioles (very small
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Kay & Roth, supra note 78 at 742.
90 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 298-99.
91 Friedberg, Diseases of the Heart 427 (2d ed. 1956).
92 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 312.
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arteries) and precapillaries show thickening of their walls with
hyaline changes (occurs pathologically in degeneration of con-
nective tissue and epithelial cells), fatty deposits, and sometimes
endothelial (refers to cells lining the vessel) swelling; and (c)
capillary or arteriocapillary fibrosis, which consists essentially of
an increase of fibrils in the walls of the capillaries and precapil-
laries. 93
Further, Rothschild characterizes the neuropathologic pic-
ture in psychoses with cerebral arteriosclerosis by vascular
changes and a variety of focal lesions, in which the cerebral
structure is destroyed as a whole, partially or completely, with
relatively good preservation of the rest of the tissues. 94 The
arteries at the base of the brain often show atheromatous lesions
(the fatty degeneration and infiltration by lipids of the walls of
the vessels) and in the majority of cases the brain displays one
or more areas of softening, which may be anemic or hemor-
rhagic.95
Microscopically, the small vessels regularly show involve-
ment, which is usually severe and widespread. In the cerebral
cortex and white matter, the microscopic changes consist of foci
of complete destruction, foci of incomplete destruction, and small
hemorrhages of old or recent origin.9 In other parts of the
brain, the putamen and basal ganglia, both important subcortical
regions of the brain, may show pronounced changes. Also focal
lesions are found frequently in the cerebellum and occasionally
in the brain stemyr
Rothschild believes that many cases of arteriosclerotic
psychosis develop solely on the basis of damage to the brain, and
that this occurs more frequently than in senile psychosis. 98
Furthermore, he has tried to show that a considerable number
of the arteriosclerotic patients possess inadequate and poorly
balanced personalities, and as a result are highly vulnerable,
breaking down mentally in the face of damage which could be
overcome by persons of a more robust makeup.99
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Rothschild, op. cit. supra, note 50 in Kaplan at 313.
96 Id. at 314-15.
97 Id. at 316.
98 Id. at 318.
99 Rothschild, The Role of the Premorbid Personality in Arteriosclerotic
Psychoses, 100 Am. J. Psychiatry 501, 504 (1944).
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The patients with arteriosclerotic psychoses usually showed
one or more of the following features: headache, dizziness,
syncopal (fainting) attacks, convulsive seizures, symptoms of
cardiac decompensation, and apoplectiform attacks. 10 0 Studies
by Kay and Roth revealed that after these signs of cerebral in-
volvement raised blood pressure was the next most frequent
condition associated with arteriosclerotic psychosis.1 10
The onset of the mental symptoms in cerebral arteriosclero-
sis may be sudden or gradual. An acute onset, taking the form
of a sudden attack of confusion, has been noted in more than
half of the cases. 10 2 The individual may show marked clouding
of consciousness, complete loss of contact with his surroundings,
incoherence, and pronounced restlessness. 10 3 Even in states of
severe confusion due to arteriosclerotic disease, there may be
fleeting periods during which the person is able to appreciate
his situation.10 4 Confusional attacks may occur in both senile
and arteriosclerotic psychoses; however, in the senile type, the
confusional state is more persistent, whereas in the arterioscle-
rotic one, episodes of lucidity may occur in the midst of occasional
confusional states. 10 5 For example, when questioned about his
memory, one with cerebral arteriosclerosis may respond that he
has difficulty, whereas a psychotic individual without signs and
symptoms characteristic of cerebral arteriosclerosis may state
that his memory is quite good.10 6 That an individual afflicted
with cerebral arteriosclerosis may have remissions or "lucid in-
tervals" has important medico-legal significance.
Owing to differences in expert testimony and the limited
medical knowledge of the courts, the difficulty in giving a strict
definition of the term "lucid interval" is apparent. 10 7 The old
idea of the lucid interval was that it was a temporization to per-
fect sanity' 0 8-"an interval in which the mind having thrown off
100 Rothschild, The Clinical Differentiation of Senile and Arteriosclerotic
Psychoses, 98 Am. J. Psychiatry 324, 325 (1941).
101 Kay & Roth, supra note 78 at 742.
102 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 319.
103 Ibid.
104 Rothschild, The Clinical Differentiation of Senile and Arteriosclerotic
Psychoses, 98 Am. J. Psychiatry 324, 329 (1941).
105 II American Handbook of Psychiatry, op. cit. supra note 60 at 1039.
106 Interview with Theodore F. Lindberg, M.D.
107 Hasson, Wills--The Lucid Interval in Testamentary Mental Capacity, 16
Notre Dame Law. 234 (1941).
108 1 Page, Wills, sec. 12.36 at 642 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1960).
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the disease had recovered its general habit." 109 The modern
definition of the lucid interval contemplates a period in which
an insane person is so far free from disease that the ordinary
legal consequences of insanity do not apply to acts done there-
in.110 The law thus admits the possibility of a lucid interval of
this nature which requires a less complete restoration of sanity
than the old definition.1
No precise rules can be laid down as to the degree of mental
competency that must exist in a particular lucid interval. In-
stead, this must in each case be decided by a study of the facts
involved in the making of the will. The rule as to testamentary
competency in cases of lucid intervals is the same as that in
other situations where mental competency is in doubt. 112 Careful
attention must be paid to the ability to grasp broad problems.
For example, a very simple will with gifts to a few beneficiaries
may not require the same amount of insight as would be re-
quired in a very complex will intended to benefit numerous in-
dividuals. Even though a number of items may be compre-
hended and adequately dealt with separately, it does not always
follow that the meaning of them taken together can be grasped. 13
Further, one must be careful to distinguish between the true
lucid interval and mere abatement of the more violent symptoms
of psychosis. On the other hand, caution must be exercised in
recognizing the acute confused or delirious states which fre-
quently initiate the psychosis in an elderly individual and may
accompany a variety of physical illnesses, among which are
alkalosis, anoxia, hypoglycemia, uremia, hepatic coma, etc. In
some of these foregoing instances remissions may occur and the
individual may be left with a varying amount of intellectual im-
pairment. Strictly speaking, such a reversible toxic process is
not part of senile psychosis or cerebral arteriosclerosis but repre-
sents a reaction to which the elderly person is particularly
prone.1 4
Rothschild thinks that arteriosclerotic psychoses are con-
fused with senile psychoses more frequently than with any other
109 Attorney-General v. Parnther, 3 Brown Ch. 441 (1792), Lord Thurlow's
opinion.
110 1 Page, Wills op. cit. supra note 108 at 642.
11 Ibid.
112 Id. at 643.
113 Singer & Krohn, Insanity and Law 86 (1924).
114 Noyes & Kolb, op. cit. supra note 1 at 291.
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condition. 115 He maintains that arteriosclerotic disorders are
easily recognizable, with headache, dizziness, explosive emotional
outbursts, and apoplectiform phenomena in the foreground.1 10
Also, convulsive seizures point to arteriosclerotic disease; in his
experience they do not occur in senile dementia.11 He deems
general tissue alterations of a senile nature suggestive of senile
psychosis, but they are by no means rare in arteriosclerotic dis-
orders."" Further, he points out that arteriosclerotic mental
disease often affects relatively young persons, but there is so
much overlapping of the ages in the two psychoses that this often
is of little diagnostic help. 119 In general, Rothschild has noted
that more complex psychopathologic disturbances are less likely
to occur in psychoses with cerebral arteriosclerosis than in senile
psychosis. 120
In studies by the Palmer group, senile and arteriosclerotic
psychoses of the true types resulting from degenerative cortical
changes were found not reversible, but in cases not diagnostically
distinguishable from the true types, correction of a second more
obscure layer of complications had a recovery rate of 25 per
cent.1 2' Although the prognosis of advanced senile dementia is
said to be manifestly hopeless and with no well-defined remis-
sions to be expected, 122 others believe that there is no such
specific disease entity as senile dementia or senile psychosis and
that remissions may occur in a senile psychotic individual. 123
In the past, once the diagnosis of senile psychosis was placed,
there was a tendency to discontinue further attempts at in-
ducing a remission; however, with recent emphasis upon geriatric
psychiatry and newer modes of psychiatric therapy, time and
effort spent on some patients labeled as senile psychotics have
produced remissions. 124
Aside from the toxic psychoses associated with acute delir-
115 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 324.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 324.
120 Id. at 325.
121 Palmer, Braceland & Hastings, Somato-Psychic Disorders of Old Age,
99 Am. J. Psychiatry 856, 862 (1943).
122 Noyes & Kolb, op. cit. supra note 1 at 293.
123 Interview with Ruth Ehrenberg, M.D.; Ewalt, Strecker & Ebaugh, Prac-
tical Clinical Psychiatry 148-51 (8th ed. 1957).
124 Interview with Ruth Ehrenberg, M.D.
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ious and confused states, there are many other disorders giving
rise to psychoses in aged persons in whom diagnostic problems
may arise. Diabetes may be one, for a variety of mental dis-
turbances, such as depressive reactions and clouded or confused
states, have been attributed to it.1 2 5 However, diabetes may be
associated with arterial degeneration, as a result of which an
arteriosclerotic psychosis may develop. Nevertheless, a true
diabetic psychosis should respond to appropriate therapy and
not follow the course of an arteriosclerotic disorder. 26 Individ-
uals showing organic symptoms following pellagra, cretinism or
other disturbances in metabolism, may present similar difficult
diagnostic problems.
Almost any organic condition of the central nervous system
may cause convulsive disorders, but seizures associated with
known brain pathology are properly classified under the cause
of the basic pathology such as neurosyphilis, cerebral arterio-
sclerosis, etc. A few individuals with epilepsy, regardless of the
underlying cause, may begin to deteriorate and develop symp-
toms of a chronic brain syndrome. 127 There is usually a history
of epilepsy with prolonged and frequent grand mal attacks that
have been improperly or incompletely controlled.
128
Involutional psychoses may be mistakenly labeled as senile
or arteriosclerotic psychoses, since the former often occurs in a
late middle-aged person; for example, in a woman after the
menopause or in a man after retirement from work. Yet accord-
ing to standard practice the conclusive point is the presence of
definite defects of intellectual activities in senile psychoses and
cerebral arteriosclerosis and their absence in depressive as well
as paranoid involutional reactions.' 29 This distinction, however,
seems only artificial, since the same causes giving rise to the in-
volutional reaction could similarly be present in the case of an
older person who had already begun to show more clinical
changes due to aging.
Cerebral embolism may occur in the older age group and
may lead to a psychosis which is indistinguishable from arterio-
sclerotic mental disorders. Since it produces essentially the
same damage to the cerebral tissue, it is readily seen why the
125 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 326.
126 Ibid.
127 Ewalt, Strecker & Ebaugh, op. cit. supra note 123 at 147.
128 Ibid.
129 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 308.
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two may be confused. On discovering the underlying etiology,
such as vegetations on the heart valves from which the emboli
arise, the differentiation is simple.130
Neurosyphilis, or as it is often called, general paresis, does
not in itself void testamentary competency 131 unless some es-
sential of testamentary competency is impaired. Apparently the
same rule would be applicable to epilepsy, chronic encephalitis,
and congenital brain anomalies.13 2 Vascular forms of neuro-
syphilis may closely resemble psychoses with cerebral arterio-
sclerosis so that their differentiation will depend on serologic
study of the blood and spinal fluid. 133
Brain tumors may present a picture of general intellectual
impairment as the primary feature; 134 and if this occurs in
elderly people, it may be diagnosed as senile psychosis. In order
to avoid confusion with either senile psychosis or arterioscle-
rotic disorders, X-ray studies and electroencephalographic data
may help establish the correct diagnosis.135 Tumors of the brain
producing the organic syndrome may be primary or metastatic.130
The pre-senile disorders, Alzheimer's disease and Pick's
lobar atrophy, may resemble senile brain disorders in some ways.
In Alzheimer's disease the onset is usually earlier, in the forties
or fifties, and there is more profound impairment of the intel-
lectual faculties at an early stage of the disease.13 7 In Alzhei-
mer's disease the microscopic and gross pathological findings are
similar to those in senile atrophy but usually more striking."' s
In Pick's disease there is patchy shrinkage of cerebral tissue
with accentuation of sulcus volume and diminished size in gyri.
Atrophy occurs in parts of the frontal, temporal, or parietal lobe,
or in combinations.1 3 9 Also, in Pick's lobar atrophy the onset
is usually earlier than in senile psychosis, but it has been ob-
served in older persons.140
180 Id. at 326.
1"1 Succession of Moody, 227 La. 609, 80 So. 2d 93 (1955).
132 Usdin, Testamentary Capacity: A Medicolegal Problem, 172 Int'l Record
of Medicine, 629, 634 (1959).
138 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 327.
134 Sachs, Meningiomas with Dementia as the First and Presenting Feature,
96 J. Ment. Sci. 998 (1950).
135 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 309.
136 Ewalt, Strecker & Ebaugh, op. cit. supra note 123 at 151.
137 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 309.
138 Anderson, Pathology 1336 (4th ed. 1961).
19 Ibid.
140 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 309.
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More common than either Alzheimer's or Pick's disease is
Huntington's chorea. 141 It is a disease of middle age, degenera-
tive and progressive, and is associated with intellectual deteriora-
tion. Neurologic findings consist of choreiform movements
characterized by involuntary contractions of muscles and ataxia,
an inability to coordinate voluntary muscular movements. These
findings, plus the "skater's gait," are so pronounced that the
diagnosis is not often mistaken for other disorders. 142
Drug addiction and alcoholism are other illnesses that often
provoke doubts of mental incompetency. The ability of the in-
dividual to satisfy the criteria of testamentary competency on
the day the will was made is the important issue. To invalidate
the will, the testator at the time of the execution of the will must
have been so overpowered by the toxic substance that he was
incapable of meeting the criteria of testamentary competency; or
alcoholic or drug consumption must have been indulged in for
so long that permanent degeneration of the brain, such as al-
coholic Korsakoff's psychosis had set in.143 Some types of senile
psychosis may superficially resemble an alcoholic Korsakoff's
psychosis.1 44
Aphasia is the impairment of the capacity to use words as
symbols of ideas. Aphasia is organic and is caused by a lesion or
lesions, such as vascular insults in the cerebral cortex and as-
sociation paths of the dominant hemisphere. 145 Some aphasia
victims sustain considerable intellectual deficits, others relatively
little. For example, there are individuals with aphasia who can-
not understand or comprehend the spoken word but can com-
prehend the written word. Attorneys and physicians having no
intimate knowledge of aphasia can come too rapidly to the con-
clusion that the patient is not in a fit mental condition to make
a will.140 This is not particularly surprising, since not too long
ago aphasics were thought to be insane. In some instances, by
the use of facial expressions or nods of the head, an aphasic in-
dividual may be given the opportunity to dispose of his property
as he desires.
Delusions of marital infidelity are fairly common in severe
141 Ewalt, Strecker & Ebaugh, op. cit. supra note 123 at 152.
142 Ibid.
143 Usdin, supra note 132 at 633.
144 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 50 in Kaplan at 309.
145 Blakiston, Medical Dictionary (1st ed. 1949).
146 Usdin, supra note 132 at 634.
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mental illness, and are particularly prone to occur in the involu-
tional psychoses and in senile brain diseases. 147 If the delusion
can be shown to affect the natural recipients of the testator's
bounty, the will may be considered invalid. Some courts attempt
to emphasize the distinction between the belief in a wife's un-
faithfulness under external circumstances and a belief based on
psychotic delusion.14s Ironically, a person may disinherit some-
one on false information, e.g., about a spouse's unfaithfulness,
and the court will uphold the will.149 An individual's inability to
appreciate the nature and extent of his property, because of de-
lusions of poverty or grandeur, may be the invalidating factor.
Thus courts consider delusions as sufficient to destroy testa-
mentary competency only when they cause a disposition differ-
ing from that which testator would have otherwise willed. The
rule in a recent case is quite typical of the majority attitude on
delusions as affecting testamentary capacity:
An insane delusion that will avoid a will must affect or
enter into the execution of the will; and even if the testator
has an insane delusion on certain subjects, still if he has
mental capacity to know his property and the objects of his
bounty, and to make a disposition of his property according
to a plan formed by him, the will cannot be set aside on the
ground of mental incapacity. A mental disturbance, there-
fore, may or may not reach the state where one loses his
capacity to make a valid will. .... 150
The eccentric person may make a valid will, in spite of the
peculiarity of his conduct. 151 A person may believe in witch-
craft, clairvoyance, spiritual influences, premonitions, mind read-
ing, transmigration of the soul, or occult religions, but this should
not affect the validity of his will.15 2 Violent temper,153 moral
depravity, 154 or eccentricity regarding health, wearing apparel,
hobbies, table manners, or language in themselves do not render
the testator mentally incompetent. 15
By itself illiteracy has no probative value, since it does not
147 Id. at 635.
148 In re McDowell's Will, 140 Atl. 281, aff'd. 103 N. J. Eq. 346, 143 Atl. 325
(1928).
149 Usdin, supra note 132 at 635.
150 Roller v. Kurtz, 6 Ill. 2d 618, 627, 129 N. E. 2d 693, 697 (1955).
151 In re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P. 2d 682 (1956).
152 Usdin, supra note 132 at 635.
153 Prentis v. Bates, 93 Mich. 234, 53 N. W. 153 (1892).
154 In re Schwartz's Will, 79 Okla. 191, 192 Pac. 203 (1920).
155 In re Miller's Estate, 10 Wash. 2d 25, 116 P. 2d 526 (1941).
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necessarily indicate inability to understand, but it can be indica-
tive of mental deficiency. Mental deficiency (group II of the
official nomenclature) can invalidate a will, but the defect
would have to be of such an extent as to vitiate one of the cri-
teria of testamentary competency.156 The psychiatrist should
also be aware that some courts have differentiated "idiot" and
"imbecile" not on the basis of intelligence quotients but of an
idiot's being "foolish from birth" 157 and the imbecile's being in
a condition of "mental imbecility from old age" 158 as a result of
disease.
The fact that a testator is under guardianship does not mean
that he is necessarily incapable of passing the legal tests of
mental competency.159 The District of Columbia and Maryland
require that the testator be capable of executing a valid deed or
contract, which would preclude persons under guardianship
from making a will in those jurisdictions. 160 They are the only
jurisdictions, however, which equate contractual and testamen-
tary capacity.
It is not a psychiatrist's position to evaluate undue influ-
ence. Only an influence which destroys the testator's free
agency is an undue influence.' 6 ' In effect, it must be a substitu-
tion of one person's will or intention for another's. The psychia-
trist may be able to aid the court by indicating whether an
individual of the temperament described would be unduly gulli-
ble or unusually stubborn.162 Some courts, however, use frac-
tional elements of fraud, undue influence and mental incompe-
tency to spell out a composite ground. In other words, some
courts may consider mental weakness as an evidentiary fact in
the proof of fraud and undue influence. 1 63
In all cases of chronic brain syndrome legal problems rela-
tive to mental competence of the individual can arise. The
eventual decline in these conditions makes those afflicted finally
dependent upon relations or upon society for management of
their daily affairs. In frankly deteriorated cases difficult legal
156 Usdin, supra note 132 at 635.
157 Speedling v. County of Worth, 68 Iowa 152, 26 N. W. 50 (1885).
158 In Appeal of Martin, 133 Me. 422, 432, 179 Atl. 656, 661 (1935).
159 Lindman & McIntyre, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 265 (1961).
160 Md. Code Ann. sec. 93.349 (1957); D. C. Code sec. 19.101 (1951).
161 Davidson, Forensic Psychiatry 103 (1952).
162 Ibid.
163 Green, Fraud, Undue Influence and Mental Incompetency--A Study in
Related Concepts, 43 Col. L. Rev. 176 (1943).
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problems would hardly arise, yet in the earlier stages when emo-
tional changes may be more prominent than the underlying
decay, such problems may be difficult to settle.
1 4
Whether senile psychosis constitutes a separate and distinct
disease entity aside and apart from psychosis associated with
cerebral arteriosclerosis, or whether it merely represents the
clinical syndrome of dementia and psychosis occurring in an
individual who has atrophic changes in the brain, has important
medico-legal significance because of the following two implica-
tions:
(1) The courts have generally held a will invalid if made
by a testator found to have had advanced senile psychosis be-
fore or at the time the will was written.16 5 In so doing the
courts have recognized (a) that in senile psychosis there are no
chances for remissions during which the testator might be able
to meet the legal test of testamentary compentency (that is, no
lucid intervals might occur during which the testator would
know the nature and extent of his property, the natural objects
of his bounty, etc.); (b) that the diagnosis of advanced senile
psychosis established by medical testimony and accepted by the
court automatically and categorically precludes the possibility
of the testator's competency to make a will; and (c) implicitly,
that, through both (a) and (b), senile psychosis must be a spe-
cific and distinct disease entity. By denying that remissions
were possible and specifying that the individual could not know
certain things required for testamentary competency, the courts
have, in substance, been accepting the equivalent of clinical cri-
teria that must be present when the courts find the diagnosis to
be senile psychosis. Thus, because the courts have recognized
older concepts of psychiatric terminology, there has been a
tendency to equate the terms "senile psychosis" or "senile
164 Dovenmuehle, Geriatric Psychiatry 27 Law & Contemp. Prob. 133, 136
(1962).
165 Byrne v. Fulkerson, 254 Mo. 97 (1913); Donovan v. St. Joseph's Home,
295 Ill. 125, 129 N. E. 1 (1920); Mason v. Rodgriguez, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 445,
115 S. W. 868 (1909); In re Alexander's Estate, 111 Cal. App. 1, 295 Pac. 53
(1931); Contra: In re Estate of Davis, 175 Kan. 107, 259 P. 2d 211 (1953);
In re Will of Loomis, 133 Me. 181, 174 Atl. 38 (1934).
It must be kept in mind that there is an initial problem of deciding
whether the disease is so far advanced as to impair testamentary compe-
tency. In Appeal of Martin, 133 Me. 422, 434, 179 Atl. 655, 662 (1935), the
court stated, "There is, in this case, substantial evidence of the presence of
senile dementia in a state so advanced as to justify saying, as a finding of
fact, that burden of proof as to soundness of mind, when the will was made,
is not sustained."
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dementia" with testamentary incompetency. When the trier of
fact finds that a testator had advanced senile psychosis or senile
dementia, the courts seem to recognize that the inquiry into the
testator's knowledge of the nature and extent of his property
and other allied questions becomes nothing more than a pro-
cedural formality, since the negative answers to these legal
questions of testamentary competency would be perfunctorily
elicited once the issue of whether or not the testator were af-
flicted with senile psychosis was decided in the affirmative.
(2) At least one court has explicitly stated that cerebral
arteriosclerosis is not the same as senile dementia. 16 6 It is recog-
nized in medicine that some of those individuals classified as
having psychoses associated with cerebral arteriosclerosis may
have lucid intervals during which the individual is able to ap-
preciate his true situation. This fluctuation or "spotty" sen-
sorium is perhaps the most characteristic defect of arterioscle-
rotic brain disease."-7 If the recognition that cerebral arterio-
sclerosis is a disease entity distinct from senile psychosis could
be substantiated clinically, then the door would be open to ex-
pand this concept, providing that adequate medical proof were
available when the competency of a testator with cerebral ar-
teriosclerosis is being contested. Further, less litigation over
competency might result if the lawyer and psychiatrist were
able to cooperate more expeditiously in selecting a lucid interval
for having the cerebral arteriosclerotic testator write his will.
On the other hand, if senile psychosis can be shown to be
nothing but psychosis of a senile individual in whom the cer-
ebral impairment is due to atrophy and loss of nerve cells, re-
gardless of the cause and whether or not cerebral arteriosclero-
sis is present, there would be a valid reason for the courts (a)
to reconsider their previous holdings that senile psychosis or
senile dementia categorically precluded testamentary compe-
tency; and (b) to accept the idea that a senile psychotic can have
"lucid intervals" in the absence of marked findings of cerebral
arteriosclerosis, should this in fact occur during the time the will
is made. Thus the recognition by the courts that senile psychosis
is not necessarily a distinct disease entity would enable some
senile individuals who are also psychotic and who do not have
clinically demonstrable cerebral arteriosclerosis, yet who do
166 In re Chylak's Estate, 55 Lackawanna Jurist 129, 131 (Pa. 1954).
167 Ewalt, Strecker & Ebaugh, op. cit. supra note 123 at 145.
Sept., 1964
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss3/3
SENILE TESTATOR
have remissions, to make a will during the remissions, provided
they could otherwise qualify by meeting the legal standards of
testamentary competency. Thus their wills would be upheld
more often since they would be less vulnerable to attacks based
on a diagnosis of senile psychosis or senile dementia.
Regardless of whether or not senile psychosis is ultimately
found to be a separate and distinct disease entity, a discovery
which should only be of primary value for purposes of medical
disease classification, the wisest course for the psychiatrist
should be to steer clear of the use of the terms "senile psychosis"
and "senile dementia."
Unfortunately the courts have a proclivity to impose the
medical classification upon the individual, provided the law ac-
cepts the classification, just as the courts require the individual
to follow the law, provided the courts do not overrule the law
because it is unconstitutional or otherwise overburdens society.
Perhaps the psychiatrists' recent de-emphasis of classification of
mental disorders could represent the first milestone in persuad-
ing the courts to overrule some of the older psychiatric classifi-
cations accepted by the courts in days gone by. In any event,
medical classification should be accepted for what it is, a means
of shorthand for facilitating communcation within the medical
field.
III. The Legal Context: Attorney-Client, Testation, and
Will Contest
The attorney should realize from the outset that he has a
distinctly personal obligation to his elderly clients. It frequently
happens that a person of advanced years has no living relatives,
or at least none who is willing to look after his best interests.
Indeed, the lawyer may be the only person available to hire a
nurse or housekeeper or to give moral reassurance. 16 In order
for the attorney to fill this role, it is imperative that he recognize
incipient mental disorders. And mental disorders of later life, it
has been seen, are particularly hard to diagnose. Even where
there are significant changes in personality and habit, the law-
yer may find it impossible to distinguish a true organic disorder
from mere senescence. If for no other reason than to assure
his client adequate medical attention, the lawyer should resolve
any doubts in favor of a complete mental and physical examina-
tion.
168 Interview with Richard S. Bowers, Esq.
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While the courts are seldom involved at this stage, the law-
yer may face difficult moral decisions. Fiduciary responsibility
takes on a greater significance when old people are concerned.
On the positive side, judges have commended the efforts of
lawyers in caring for an aged testator. "Their conduct . . . does
great honor not only to the profession of the law, but to the un-
selfish impulses which prompted such lofty and magnanimous
conduct toward the incompetent." 169
While humanitarian desiderata lie beyond the sanctions of
the bar, ethical considerations must be observed. Most lawyers
know that to draft a will for an incompetent person is a breach
of professional duty.170 Indeed, courts have reprimanded drafts-
men for failing to make sufficient inquiry as to competence. 17 1
Hence the general practice is to err on the side of conservatism.
When the lawyer suspects incapacity, he usually will refuse to
proceed with the case. 172 This attitude reflects respect for the
law. Yet, it is submitted that too rigorous an application of this
rule deprives the senile testator of his right to make a will.
The making of a will is of particular importance to most el-
derly persons. Recently, a famous sociologist 173 pointed out that
since the aged live in the last period of their lives, their main
concern will be "to get the most important things done while
there is yet time." And surprisingly these "most important
things" are largely responsibilities to outside persons and
causes.174 Thus it would seem that a lawyer's peremptory re-
fusal to draft a will for a senile person may frustrate a legitimate
expectation. For as seen above, neither senescence nor senility
implies testamentary incompetence. Deprivation of the right of
testation without adequate grounds has harsh effects upon the
aged. Where ethics and free testation are in conflict, this may
be resolved by a psychiatric examination of the testator. The
lawyer should abide by the medical findings.
The prudent lawyer, having satisfied himself that his client
has testamentary capacity, should anticipate a will contest from
169 Matter of Van Den Heuvel, 76 Misc. 137, 141, 136 N. Y. Supp. 1109, 1112
(1912).
170 Interview with Professor A. James Casner.
171 See e.g. Gilmer v. Brown, 186 Va. 630, 642, 44 S. E. 2d 16, 22 (1947).
172 Interview with Richard S. Bowers, Esq.
173 Parsons, The Aging in American Society, 27 Law & Contemp. Prob. 22,
34 (1962).
174 Ibid.
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as early as the drafting stage. Age is not enough to invalidate a
will,' 7 5 yet it bears on testamentary capacity. Moreover, eviden-
tiary facts tending to prove mental incompetency also relate to
issues of fraud and undue influence.176 The threat of a will con-
test is greater than would seem at first blush. Not only are dis-
inherited next of kin likely to object, but even beneficiaries
aggrieved by the relative size or form of their gifts frequently
initiate a contest. 177 And an allegation of mental incompetency
often is used as a tool to exhort a settlement.1 78
While some jurisdictions uphold a provision in the will for-
feiting a beneficiary's legacy if he contests the will, others do
not.179 In any case, when ordinary forces tending to upset a will
are present in a will executed by a testator of advanced age, the
peculiar vulnerability of the instrument is evident.
Where a will deviates considerably from the "normal" or
"reasonable," serious doubt arises as to whether it can withstand
the challenge of mental incompetency. The tendency of the courts
to judge testamentary capacity from the rationality of the instru-
ment may be condemned on the ground that it arbitrarily limits
the testator's right of disposition. The judges' notion of reason-
ableness may not accord with facts wholly within the testator's
memory. But the judicial attitude cannot be wished away; law-
yers must cope with it as best they can. Because a testator may
have logical yet unexplained reasons for a particular bequest or
devise, the draftsman, or preferably the examining psychiatrist,
should get written evidence of these reasons. Indeed, at every
step of the way the lawyer should record his relationship with
the client in factual memoranda.
To resolve ethical doubts and to protect the senile testa-
tor's will from contest, a neuro-psychiatric examination at the
time of testation has been proposed.8 0 There are however ob-
jections to this procedure.' 8 ' In the first place the examination
may reveal the worst-that the elderly person is not competent
to execute a will. Or regardless of such findings, the mere fact
'75 See supra, pp. 23-24.
176 Green, supra note 3 at 307.
177 Interview with Richard S. Bowers, Esq.
178 Interview with Richard S. Bowers, Esq.
179 Casner, Estate Planning 53 n. 11 (3d ed. 1961).
180 Stephens, Probate Psychiatry-Examination of Testamentary Capacity
by a Psychiatrist as a Subscribing Witness, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 276 (1930).
181 Note, Psychiatric Assistance in the Determination of Testamentary Ca-
pacity, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1116, 1118 (1953).
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that an examination was made may suggest to opposing counsel
that even the testator's own attorney doubted his testamentary
capacity. The examination may give the impression that the
testator's lawyer "shopped around" for an amenable psychiatrist.
None of these objections should be fatal to the case for medical
examination.
If the psychiatric examination indicates that the senile tes-
tator lacks testamentary capacity, the lawyer's knowledge of
this disability is not harmful. In such a case the ethical choice
will lose its ambiguity. Refusal to draft a will does not then
defeat a right of free testation, since such right is clearly pre-
cluded by the testator's incompetency. Moreover, the findings
may warrant a petition for conservatorship, which would pro-
tect the incompetent's estate and would preserve an otherwise
lost client.
The second objection, stressing the unfavorable inferences
created by the psychiatric examination, can be met in various,
somehow risky, ways. According to prevailing practice, lawyers
call in psychiatrists at testation only in extreme cases, regardless
of the age factor.1 82 This involves considerable risk for it meets
the inference by deferring to it. The lawyer, admitting that
mental competence is doubtful, maintains nonetheless that the
doubts have been resolved in his favor. But this admission in-
vites contest, for it opens the argument that the testator's coun-
sel merely purchased a favorable result.
There is a more effective way to destroy the inference that
testator's competency was in doubt. If psychiatric examinations
became a matter of course for every will client above sixty years
of age, opposing counsel could not effectively suggest that there
were doubts as to capacity in a given case. And if a group of
available psychiatrists were requested regularly on a rotation
basis, much of the "shopping around" argument could be si-
lenced. Perhaps the chief benefit from this practice would be
to reduce the very threat of will contest. Potential contestants
would be discouraged at the outset from litigating hopeless
claims.
On the other hand, while concluding that such a rigid pol-
icy might be wise if imposed by statute, legal practitioners seem
to resist innovations in their own practice.18 3 They say that the
182 Interviews with Professor A. James Casner and Richard S. Bowers, Esq.
183 Ibid.
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costs of medical examinations could not be justified in most
cases, especially when repetition would be required for codicils
and later wills. 8 4 Moreover, the practical difficulty of convinc-
ing a will client that such examination is to protect his will from
challenge rather than to confirm his lawyer's suspicions may
cause the client to go elsewhere for legal services.
8 5
Perhaps the objections of expense and client attitude could
be solved by use of psychiatric assistance on a volume basis and
by the development in the field of psychiatry of a standard ex-
amination to assess testamentary capacity. Indeed, regular re-
course to medical assistance would not only spread costs (in the
manner of physical examinations for insurance or employment
purposes), but it would also tend to lessen a given testator's
apprehensiveness toward such a test. For the lawyer could then
say to reassure his elderly client: "It is the common practice in
this firm to examine every testator over sixty years old so that
psychiatric evidence will be on hand to protect his will from pos-
sible contest."
The psychiatric examination may serve another, more spe-
cialized purpose. It has been seen that the clinical manifestations
of senile brain disorders run an irregular course. A sufferer may
be better on some days than on others; he may show coherence
in the morning hours and lose it in the afternoon. Even in any
degenerative mental disorder, remissions can be a recurring phe-
nomenon.8 6 Therefore the geriatric psychiatrist can assist the
lawyer in two further ways: he can indicate whether "lucid
interval" may be expected from a particular testator; 8 7 he can
evidence the occurrence and the degree of remission.
If the psychiatric examination of the senile testator is to
protect a will from challenge, it must elicit responses to the three
questions posed by the legal test. For this reason, the selection
of a medical expert may be determinative of favorable results.
As the mind is the primary subject for study, a psychiatrist would
be better qualified than a family physician. On the other hand,
some psychiatrists without geriatric training may lack ability to
recognize senile brain disorders. Research into the mental dis-
eases of later life has made geriatric psychiatry a near specialty.
184 Interview with Professor A. James Casner.
185 Ibid.
186 See supra pp. 46-47.
187 Usdin, The Psychiatrist and Testamentary Capacity, 32 Tul. L. Rev. 89,
95 (1957).
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Therefore, the lawyer should secure a psychiatrist familiar with
geriatrics. Of course, where specialized talent is unavailable, the
lawyer will have to settle for a physician or psychiatrist with
lesser experience in geriatrics.
The attorney's next concern will be the expert's unfamili-
arity with the legal doctrine of testamentary capacity. Even
psychiatrists who regularly appear in court, show unfamiliarity
with the legal standard.18 In this important area, law and
medicine have failed to communicate. 189 As one psychiatrist has
noted, ". . . little can be found in recent psychiatric literature
regarding testamentary capacity." 190 Hence the lawyer should be
prepared to instruct his medical expert in the nature and policy
of the legal test for competency. For ". . . the important factor
to be considered by the medical expert is whether or not any es-
sential element of testamentary capacity is impaired by the ill-
ness." 191 To make this finding, knowledge of the testamentary
criteria is essential.192
A classic law review article has set forth in some detail the
ground to be covered in a forensic neuro-psychiatric examina-
tion.193 The author recommended six categories of observation:
(1) general appearance, (2) circumstances surrounding the mak-
ing of the will, (3) previous physical and mental health, (4)
present physical health, (5) neurological condition, and (6)
mental condition.194 The mental examination should be directed
to orientation, mood, and memory.195 Such inquiry accords with
the common symptoms of the organic brain syndrome: inability
to think conceptually, loss of recent memory, disorientation, and
shallowness of effect.
1 96
Psychiatry has not yet devised a routine medical test to
elicit responses required by the legal test.1 97 Moreover, as in-
188 Interview with Theodore F. Lindberg, M.D.
189 Usdin, supra note 187 at 99.
190 Ibid.
191 Id. at 92.
192 Note, supra note 181 at 1121.
193 See Hulbert, Probate Psychiatry-A Neuro-Psychiatric Examination of
Testator from the Psychiatric Viewpoint, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 288 (1930).
194 Id. at 290-1.
195 Id. at 291-2.
196 Interview with Ruth Ehrenberg, M.D.; see supra, following note 33.
197 However, Dr. Ehrenberg pointed out that psychological tests utilizing
block design and figures may allow an observing psychiatrist to measure the
subject's capacity for abstract or principled thought. She cautioned that
common physical defects in old age, such as poor eyesight and color blind-
ness, may make the results misleading.
Sept., 1964
36https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss3/3
SENILE TESTATOR
dicated above, there are inherent difficulties in distinguishing
mere senescence from senility and senile brain disease. In the
first place, some loss of recent memory is a normal incident of old
age (to which some old people adjust with the help of penciled
reminders) .19s Secondly, egocentricity usually accompanies the
aging process as a person withdraws from active affairs. Hence
an ignorance of current events or an inability to identify the
President may or may not be the result of a mental disorder.199
In view of these difficulties, the lawyer should insist on a com-
plete clinical examination.
20 0
The most popular arena for jousting over the spoils is the
will contest. It has been described as an "acrimonious . . . pub-
lic display of soiled linen and the uncloseting of family skele-
tons." 201 Whatever havoc the will contest may wreak upon the
professions of law and medicine, it is clear that such a battle
necessarily depletes the decedent's estate and casts notoriety
upon the testator and his survivors. Since the human and ma-
terial costs are high, litigants' counsel should give special heed
to proof. In this regard the medical specialist must not be under-
estimated.
Depending upon the jurisdiction, questions of testamentary
capacity may arise on objections prior to probate, at the time of
probate, or on an appeal from an order granting probate. 20 2 In-
equality in the disposition of the estate when buttressed "... . by
even slight evidence of want of testamentary capacity . . . are
sufficient to take the case to the jury." 203 Whether or not a par-
ticular state places the burden of proof of establishing testa-
mentary capacity on the proponent of the will, the presumption
of sanity puts the real burden of persuasion of incompetency
upon the contestants.20 4 This policy aims to equalize the divi-
sion of burdens and to protect testacy.20 5 However, in the case
of the senile testator the burden of proving incompetency may
not be a very heavy one.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Interview with Theodore F. Lindberg, M.D.
201 Cavers, Ante Mortem Probate: An Essay in Preventive Law, 1 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 440, 441 (1934).
202 Hills, Layman Opinion in Will Contests, 2 Trial Lawyers Guide 209
(1958).
203 Pardue v. Pardue, 312 Ky. 370, 374, 227 S. W. 2d 403, 406 (1950).
204 Epstein, supra note 24 at 238.
205 Slough, Testamentary Capacity: Evidentiary Aspects, 36 Texas L. Rev.
1, 24 (1957).
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The question of the testator's mental competency is for the
jury to decide.200 It follows that the parties must provide the
trier of fact with sufficient "wisdom and understanding" neces-
sary to determine that question.20 7 The examination of lay and
expert witnesses should be directed to this end.20s
Difficulties at the will contest usually stem from failure to
employ a psychiatrist at the time of will execution. 20 9 Both lay
and expert witnesses operate under serious impediments. The
layman must state observations of the testator made at a time
when he was not thinking in terms of testamentary capacity.2 10
And the expert, within the context of the hypothetical question,
must base his conclusions on testimony offered by laymen.2 11
Because of these obvious inadequacies, physicians attending the
deceased testator at the time of testation, rather than psychi-
atrists, may become the most productive medical experts.2 12
Although "the courts have been notoriously discourteous to
the medical expert who gives an opinion on incompetency," 213
it would seem that even a medical opinion based on hypothetical
facts should be given greater weight than lay testimony "...
since conduct without interpretation is meaningless, and since
medical experts are in a position to furnish the most valid in-
terpretations." 214 In most states the lay witness may give his
opinion of a person's mental competency if he also divulges the
facts upon which he bases an opinion.2 15 However, the layman
is apt to rely on superficial observation in assessing mental com-
petence. Indeed, ordinary senile changes may have misled close
friends and relatives who tend to contrast the decedent's mental
condition at testation with his "former self." Only a geriatric
physician or psychiatrist is apt to assess properly the clinical
subtleties.
The medical expert can assist the court in determining the
206 1 Page, op. cit. supra note 10, sec. 12.16 at 595.
207 Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414, 428 (1952).
208 Ibid.
209 Note, supra note 181 at 1118.
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Usdin, supra note 187 at 89.
213 Green, supra note 3 at 284.
214 Green, supra note 3 at 283.
215 Ibid.; cf. Hills, supra note 202 at 209-10. It should be noted that the
attesting witnesses may express an opinion as to the testator's mental ca-
pacity without detailing the basis for their views. See Hills, supra note 202
at 214.
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relevant period of time surrounding the will execution about
which evidence may be received. Morever, if a diagnosis of
cerebral arteriosclerosis has been made, the doctor can testify
as to whether a "lucid interval" was medically probable.
Procedures have been suggested for improving the presenta-
tion of medical evidence in a will contest: (1) court supervision
of the framing of hypothetical questions, (2) postponement of
psychiatric testimony until other evidence on the question of
capacity has been presented, and (3) pretrial interchange of in-
formation among opposing psychiatrists.2 16 If medical testimony
is destined to play a continuing and expanding role in the legal
system of tomorrow, it should be emphasized that opportunities
for using psychiatric assistance are available today. Lawyers
should be aware of the mental disorders of old age; they should
tap the new resources of geriatric psychiatry when the senile
testator needs protection.
IV. Conclusion
The foregoing study should familiarize the lawyer with the
psychiatric approach. Similarly, it is hoped that the physician,
particularly the geriatric psychiatrist, learns to appreciate more
fully the legal implications of psychiatric terminology and to
utilize more effectively his knowledge in the courtroom.
Particular emphasis has been placed upon senile psychoses
and psychoses associated with cerebral arteriosclerosis because
these two diagnostic labels are most frequently imposed upon
senile individuals who become psychotic. Further, the infuriating
vagueness and instability of meaning of these two terms, in
both the clinic and the courtroom, signify that a lack of coordina-
tion between medicine and law may arise. Unless attempts are
made to narrow both the legal and medical implications of
these terms, in future years the confusion will be compounded,
for the population in the over-sixty-five age bracket is rapidly
increasing and the concurrent rise in economic prosperity will
be reflected in more wills disposing of greater wealth.
While psychiatry has made considerable progress, especially
in the field of geriatrics in recent years, the law has lagged be-
hind in recognizing these advances. Not only has the use of
psychiatric terminology by the courts remained dormant, but
the lawyers have hesitated to rely on medical experts when
testamentary capacity is in question.
216 Note, supra note 181 at 1120-1.
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